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This article examines the challenge Norway and France face in coordinating
specialized government activities after 10 years of comprehensive reforms.
The focus is on the tension between territorial and sectoral specialization and
between vertical and horizontal specialization. We describe both sector-
specific administrative reforms and more overarching general reforms,
looking at similarities and differences in the reorganization choices made by
the two countries and also at what drives change. We argue that a combina-
tion of factors is required to explain outcomes. These factors include not only
home-grown reforms but also sectoral challenges, diffusion and learning
from abroad, adaptation to the financial crisis and budget deficit, and choices
made by powerful political executives. Sometimes these factorswork together
and reinforce each other, producing radical reforms; at other times they have
a mutually constraining influence, resulting in only minor changes.
Introduction
The New Public Management (NPM) movement that became dominant
internationally from the 1980s has considerably challenged the principles
and the related organizational forms of contemporary government admin-
istrations. Introduction of the NPM ideas of greater autonomy, fragmen-
tation, disaggregation, and proliferation of public administration (Lægreid
and Verhoest 2010) increased the cross-sectoral challenges facing states
and changed modes of control. NPM reforms addressed mainly vertical
specialization (structural devolution and agencification) and horizontal
specialization (single-purpose organizations) but had little to offer to solve
the much bigger problem of horizontal coordination. This flaw triggered
or was accompanied at the same time by a second wave of administrative
redesign that began in the late 1990s, ushering in what is sometimes
known as the “post-NPM” era. This second wave of structural reforms
addressed central control and horizontal coordination issues and set about
introducing more integration into public sector organizations via various
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forms of mergers or cooperative arrangements (Christensen and Lægreid
2010), as illustrated by the British joined-up government initiative
(Bogdanor 2005).
These conflicting trends on the long term have somehow complexified
and blurred our understanding of organizational redesigns where too
simplistic stereotypes have often prevailed. New Zealand and the United
Kingdom were, for instance, first associated to major processes of agenci-
fication. Recent waves of “joined-up” then blurred these characterizations.
In other cases, the global and longitudinal organizational transformations
of many states were unequal among countries and remain less clear or
blurred. This is the case of Scandinavian and Napoleonic countries. Analy-
ses providing a global and diachronical map of organizational reforms
within countries on a midterm period and in comparative perspectives are
needed in order to understand organizational changes in time.
With this perspective in mind, this article proposes to compare the
transformation of the French and Norwegian administrative architecture.
Our objective is twofold: offering a fine-grained and comparative charac-
terization of the many organizational reforms that took place in France
and Norway since the late 1990s, and explaining these choices by using a
configurational approach that combines external pressures, political
factors, and domestic historical–institutional legacies.
Because of these complexified and blurred organizational maps, we
apply a mixed system research strategy (Frendreis 1983) combining most
different systems design and most similar systems design. In a mixed-
system strategy, the countries will vary along both the independent and
the dependent variables. This strategy has been used to compare admin-
istrative reforms in Norway and the United States (Christensen and Peters
1999) and Scandinavia, Australia, and New Zealand (Christensen and
Lægreid 2001). We believe this in-depth analysis of the organizational
trajectories is specifically useful to provide a more complex design of
reforms that occurred in France and Norway. By using a mixed system
research strategy, our purpose is to do this comparison not by overem-
phasizing the differences on an ex ante perspective but by exploring more
systematically the similarities and differences both in the organizational
outcomes and in the key explanatory factors.
On the one hand, France and Norway are quite different on the depen-
dent variable because the dominant organizational form that prevailed in
each country was not the same: Norway has a long tradition of agencies
and has reinforced this trend while France, with strong and resilient state
local units, has only “agencified” through ad hoc or sector-based deci-
sions. There is also a major importance of decentralization trends in
France, which has no equivalent in Norway. We want to account for these
differences, but we are not so much preoccupied with characterizing the
two systems on as many similar, independent variables as possible. There
are some similarities however. The Napoleonic influence was historically
quite strong in Norway and generated some similarities. The main one is
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that both countries have developed strong competing tensions between
the principle of ministerial responsibility (with strong specialization by
sector) and the principle of local self-government (with specialization by
territory). Norway, as most continental European countries, has a prefect
at regional (county) level. The Norwegian prefect is a senior civil servant,
and the main tasks for this servant are to control local governments in the
county and also serve as a liaison officer between central and local gov-
ernment. The Norwegian prefect is though weaker than the French one.
Benefiting from the advantages of a few cases perspective, our claim is to
identify a configuration of causal dynamics that produce the organiza-
tional outcomes. We focus especially on three explanatory factors—
political factors, institutional features, and external constraints. Norway
and France differ significantly along most of these factors. Compared to
Norway, France has a stronger and more powerful political core executive.
The financial and budgetary pressure is stronger in France than in Norway,
while the institutional pressure from international reform ideas are more
equal in the two countries.
On the other hand, our design has some similarities with the most
different system method in that we focus on variations on quite a limited
number of independent variables that may sometimes explain, because of
one key similar explanatory factor or to some specific combinations, simi-
larities in the dependent variable. First, Norway and France are usually
described as late reformers where NPM-oriented organizational changes
were less frequent. Both countries were impacted by similar contents of
administrative reforms: performance management, decentralizing trends,
and changes in structures mixing of agencies and mergers. Second, the
importance of post-NPM reforms through mergers was specifically impor-
tant in both countries, contrasting the relatively weaker influence of NPM
recipes. Issues of coordination and integration were more up front in
Norway but also quite visible in France by the early 2000, although with
sharp differences in process: France has applied an overarching reform
strategy of mergers by 2007, specifically affecting its state local units, while
the Norwegian reforms have been more gradual and more sector and
policy specific.
To fulfil this research design, the article is divided into four parts. First,
we present the theoretical approach by outlining some explanatory factors.
Second, we describe the national contexts of Norway and France by focus-
ing on specialization and coordination. Third, we present and systemati-
cally compare contemporary reforms in the two countries. Fourth, we
explain the organizational reform by focusing on political, institutional,
and environmental factors.
Theoretical Approach
Comparing organizational changes in different administrative systems
and in diachronic perspective requires a common grammar. Here,
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specialization and coordination are the two concepts we use to specify our
main dependent variables.
Specialization
We will first distinguish between specialization by purpose/task/sector
and specialization by territory/area/geography (Gulick 1937) as well as
between vertical and horizontal specialization. By vertical specialization
we mean differentiation of responsibility on hierarchical levels, describing
how political and administrative tasks and authority are allocated
between forms of affiliation (Lægreid et al. 2010). Vertical specialization
can take the form of decentralization initiatives, structural devolution,
autonomization, or agencification, meaning the transfer of responsibility
from units close to the political leadership to units that are further away
from the political national executive. Vertical despecialization implies
movement in the opposite direction—that is, moving responsibilities
closer to the central political leadership. By horizontal specialization we
mean the splitting of organizations at the same administrative level, for
example, splitting a ministry into several ministries. Horizontal special-
ization focuses on how tasks and authorities are allocated between orga-
nizations at the same hierarchical level, for example, between ministerial
areas. Horizontal despecialization implies merging organizations at the
same administrative level.
Coordination
The article has a dominant focus on specialization/despecialization, but
the relationship between specialization and coordination is also a crucial
issue to address in order to compare the organizational changes in the two
countries. Vertical coordination is concerned with the coordination of
various administrative levels, for example, between ministries and subor-
dinate authorities and between central and regional authorities. Horizon-
tal coordination concerns coordination between policy areas or sectors
such as health, education, the environment, or public transport at the same
level—be it the central, or regional level (Christensen and Lægreid 2008).
There is also a distinction between positive and negative coordination
(Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; Scharpf 1997). While negative coor-
dination is a minimal form of coordination aiming at minimizing conflicts,
positive coordination is more holistic, focusing on building up coherent
and integrated policies and means. Negative coordination entails actors
agreeing not to harm each other’s programs or policies, whereas positive
coordination is more about actually working together. Even if coordina-
tion is generally seen as a good thing, the wish to coordinate is often
greater than the wish to be coordinated. Everyone embraces coordination
as long as it does not involve its own organization.
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The relative importance of these coordination mechanisms within
administrative systems may vary over time and between different
countries. One reason why a given coordination mechanism may become
more or less important is a change in the principles of organizational
specialization. The relationship between specialization and coordination
might follow a stimulus-response pattern (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest
2010) and normally more specialization requires more coordination.
To understand and explain the reform trajectories and the organiza-
tional choices in the two countries, we regard reform processes as a
complex and configurational mixture of political factors, domestic historical–
institutional legacies, and external pressure that constrain the initiatives and
the leeway of political and administrative executives when committing
into active administrative reform policies (Christensen and Lægreid 2001).
First, the power of and initiatives taken by the political executive have
a crucial role to play in organizational choices as suggested by many
authors. The importance of political issues has been emphasized by ratio-
nal choice theorists: They stress the saliency of responsiveness and politi-
cal control in redesigning public organizations (Miller 2000; Moe 1989).
Within the constraints spell out by external pressures, the existing national
historical–institutional context and different constitutional features, politi-
cal leaders have varying amount of leeway to launch and implement
organizational reforms. Many researches emphasize this crucial weight of
political strategies in the choices for agencies (Christensen and Lægreid
2007; Van Thiel 2004; Yesilkagit and Christensen 2010), while this political
dimension has been less identified in mergers (for an exception, Bezes and
Le Lidec 2010, 2011) where dominant explanations have insisted in
the objectives of reinforcing coordination. The political administrative
executives’ identities, resources, and capacity for rational calculation and
political control are to a great extent constrained, but also enabled, by
environmental and historical–institutional features. In short, researchers
have identified the political dilemma at the heart of structural choices: a
balance between autonomy (supposed to bring more expertise and less
political risks) and political control.
Second, organizational changes take place in historically institutional-
ized contexts and thus reflect the constraints exercised by the structuring
and inherited institutional arrangements and their defenders. The
historical–institutional legacy of an administrative culture as well as its
specific institutional arrangements both have an independent effect on
contemporary reform trajectories (March and Olsen 1989). Embedded
historical principles of specialization, forms of division of labor between
units and ministries within the state, modes of coordination, and types of
hierarchies are solid institutions, which have many constraining, filtering,
and resource-distributing effects. Once established, they become an essen-
tial part of the functioning of a national administrative state and produce
legacies. Political and administrative institutional arrangements reflect the
development of strong interlinkages among actors over time on specific
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rules and structures, which have developed through times and institu-
tionalize the forms of specialization, coordination, and hierarchy. We
expect that existing institutions will influence the perception of problems
and the limitation of alternatives within the reorganization-making
process but will also inform the structure of choices (Thelen 2003).
Third, the external technical and institutional environment also matter.
First, financial pressures in the influence of the international environment
promote modern administrative reforms. Economic and financial trends
are well known to have strong implications for state organizational forms,
possibly leading to administrative restructuring programs in order to
provide more efficient policies, economies of scale, reduction of costs, and
drastic cuts in public expenditure. Second, public organizations also adopt
formal structures that embody and conform to “myths of rationality”
(“best organizational forms,” rationalistic models promoting hierarchy,
unity, purposefulness, and efficient action) that are part of the orga-
nizational field they belong to and which groups in this global “institu-
tionalized environment” (Meyer and Scott 1994) consider to be rational,
efficient, fair, and reasonable standards. Here, the adoption of a new
organizational form strongly relies on processes of diffusion of these new
templates through various networks or epistemic communities. In this
“myth perspective” (Christensen, Fimreite, and Lægreid 2007; DiMaggio
and Powell 1983), public organizations are seen to be part of institution-
alized environments that comprise many other similar organizations and
where new rational modes circulate through various structuring transna-
tional networks (political, professional, etc.).
Organizational reforms in the public sector are a complex interaction
between these different features. In this article, we show how these three
explanatory logics work together and influence one another with a con-
figurative perspective. Our claim is that organizational changes affecting
both division of labor and coordination are shaped by processes where
relationships between political strategies, institutional constraints, and
environmental pressures prevail (Katznelson 1997). Our dynamic configu-
rative approach is aimed at paying attention to these forms of interactions.
In our explanatory part, we will first put emphasis on the importance of
political control over the reform processes as this dimension appears to be
the most structuring. From then, we will show that and how political issue
varies between the two countries depending on the interdependent influ-
ence of external pressures and the historical–institutional/polity context.
But first we will give a brief outline of the historical–institutional context
in the two countries.
Historical–Institutional Context:
Polity Features, Specialization, and Coordination
The historical ties, polity features, and institutional administrative
arrangements that characterize the Norwegian and the French states
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are important to explain how changes have occurred in each country over
the last two decades. There are some main differences and similarities
between the Norwegian and French administrative system regarding spe-
cialization and coordination.
In Norway, the general Norwegian policymaking style is made of
peaceful coexistence and “revolution in slow motion” based on common
interests and consensus. The multiparty system and proportional repre-
sentation in multimember electoral districts tend to result in negotiations.
In these negotiations support is sought from different parties involved in
finding compromises. Norway has strong specialization by sector and a
clear separation between central and local government. The dual prin-
ciples of ministerial responsibility and local self-government solve some
coordination problems and produce others (Fimreite and Lægreid 2005).
Positive sector-specific vertical coordination occurs within each ministe-
rial area from central to local state level. Territorial coordination within
each county municipality is also rather positive. The main coordination
problem in the Norwegian political–administrative system is between
ministerial areas and between political–administrative levels (state–local
government). The political focus on a specific area of responsibility is
strong, and consequently the challenges of coordination across ministerial
areas are considerable, also at the political level.
In France, the political leadership is characterized by a more elitist
administrative culture and a more confrontational policymaking style
where long periods of institutional inertia alternate with radical, sudden,
and disruptive reforms. The French semi-presidential system and the use
of majority electoral rule give the executive, and specifically the President
and his government, the power and authority to take unilateral action at
the policy formulation stage, without a specific need for prior consultation
with stakeholders. This policy style has been traditionally des-
cribed as a “heroic” or a “crisis-related” (Crozier 1963) mode of change.
However, this is just one aspect of the French process, which is more often
dominated by periods of “institutional inertia” (Hayward 1976) character-
ized by strong institutions and considerable interdependence and accom-
modation due to the constraining influence of veto-players. France is also
characterized by strong ministerial and sector-based specialization with
many ministries (an average of 18 ministries and between 4 and 30 del-
egated ministries and state secretariats), about 150 central general direc-
torates, and a large number of ministerial territorial units functioning in
“silos.” This has generated positive vertical coordination inside ministries
but also strong fragmentation due to the big number of organizations.
Interministerial coordination, both at the center and at the territorial level,
has always been a problem, but the French state has also developed stron-
ger coordination and integration mechanisms than Norway, specifically
activated in periods of crisis and for specific transversal public issues
(Bezes and Le Lidec 2011; Hayward and Wright 2002). These main mecha-
nisms have historically been politicization (Rouban 2004) and ad hoc
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coordination committees and units (the National Planning Commission,
the Delegation for National Planning and Regional Policy, etc.) at the
central level. At the local level, coordination has always relied on the major
role played by the Napoleonic institution per se, the prefects (Grémion
1976; Le Lidec 2006). Prefects have historically been the integrative force at
the local level under all political regimes (through their repeated interac-
tions with local politicians) and a robust political “driving belt.” As central
government’s appointees and representatives on all matters, the role of the
prefect has been crucial as director of the local state field services and main
“adaptor” to local demands because the prefect constantly interact with
local politicians, internalized their will in the implementation process, and
arbitrated between the sector-based ministerial units. The French admin-
istration is also characterized by strong interdependent relations between
central government and local authorities: They coproduce public policies
with high coordination costs.
We will argue that Norway and France have both developed strong
vertical specialization, but horizontal specialization is stronger in France
than in Norway. Concerning the mode of coordination, both administra-
tive systems have major problems of interministerial coordination at
central level owing to ministerial silos, although the French system seems
to have more informal mechanisms offering a limited counterbalance. This
coordination problem is also stronger at the regional level in Norway than
in France because the Norwegian prefect has less power than the French
one. However, the important horizontal specialization of the French
administration at regional level, embodied in a large number of state local
units, generates more fragmentation than the Norwegian pattern with a
rather small central government and a limited number of agencies. The
Norwegian administrative system is also characterized by a clear separa-
tion between central government and regional authorities, paradoxically
generating fewer problems than the French interdependent system.
Comparing Organizational Reforms in France and Norway
Norwegian Reforms
The Reform Mode. The NPM reforms in the Norwegian civil service
started slowly in the late 1980s and gained momentum from the mid-1990s
onward (Christensen and Lægreid 2001; Olsen 1996). The Norwegian
approach to NPM reforms was pragmatic and espoused mainly the mana-
gerial tools of NPM: Management by Objectives and Results, increased
structural differentiation of the roles and functions of government,
structural devolution to agencies and state-owned companies, and
increased managerial autonomy. In the period 2001–2005, however, the
Concervative-centre government adopted some major ideas from the
NPM movement. After the center-left government took office in 2005,
more program-oriented reforms focusing on specific policy areas were
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introduced. Some features of these reforms may be categorized as
post-NPM.
In the case of Norway, we generally see dual processes of vertical
specialization and horizontal despecialization at work, especially in the
1990s (Lægreid et al. 2010). The general picture defines a movement of
organizations further away from the central political authorities combined
with mergers of similar types of organizations to increase coordination.
This can be seen as a coevolution of reform ideas and administrative
practice producing hybrids and complex organizational solutions.
The center-left majority government that came to power in 2005 ran
pretty much on an anti-NPM ticket arguing that NPM reforms should be
stopped or modified because of their negative consequences, such as
fragmentation, proliferation, and reduced political control. This view was
particularly interesting coming from the Labour Party, which had previ-
ously been seen as supporting NPM. A crucial question is whether the
anti-NPM rhetoric actually resulted in major changes. Today’s administra-
tive policy in Norway is ambiguous. It is fair to say that the pace of NPM
has slowed down but has not been reversed. What we see are post-NPM
features supplementing previous NPM reforms.
Vertical Specialization and Despecialization—Agencification and
Reassertion of the Center. In the 1990s, structural devolution became a
major reform trend in the central administrative apparatus in Norway. The
first dominant element was internal structural devolution—ordinary
agencies were given more autonomy and new independent central agen-
cies were established. Some organizations were also moved from central
to regional government. Part of this structural devolution also took the
form of granting regulatory agencies more formal autonomy than the
ordinary agencies mentioned above. This was combined with an increase
in horizontal specialization of the roles and tasks of agencies, according to
the principle of “single-purpose organizations.” There has, however, been
an unstable balance between autonomy and control. Three examples
illustrating these dilemmas will be given in the following.
In 2001, a major reform of the central immigration administration
took place in Norway. The Directorate of Immigration was given more
formal autonomy, and a new body was established with a lot of formal
autonomy—the Immigration Appeals Board. After the reorganization, the
political executive could no longer interfere in ordinary individual cases.
Steering was to be done from a distance, via general policy directives, thus
furthering professional autonomy. After this reform was implemented, it
soon became clear that the minister was not satisfied with the situation. In
2005, she therefore launched a reorganization process to exert more
control. Under the current Red-Green government, the control measures
have been tightened still further (Christensen and Lægreid 2009). The
latter efforts do not seem to have reversed the main features of the first
reform, but they do represent an attempt to weaken some of the autonomy
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in the reform of the immigration administration. It represents a case where
agencification or vertical specialization has been followed byrecentraliza-
tion or vertical despecialization.
Another case for increased vertical specialization is related to regulatory
agencies. In 2003, the Concervative-centre government proposed a regula-
tory agency reform inspired by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) model (Christensen and Lægreid 2007) that had
two main components. One was a proposal for structural devolution that
would make the regulatory agencies more independent and the role of a
regulatory agency more specialized and less ambiguous. The second main
element was to relocate the chosen regulatory agencies, that is, move them
out of Oslo. After a tug-of-war between the minority government and the
opposition, the relocation was agreed on, but it was decided that the
devolution principle should not be applied to all regulatory agencies.
A third reform addressing the issue of vertical specialization and
despecialization was the hospital reform in 2002, where responsibility for
hospitals was transferred from the counties to the central government. The
reform centralized the ownership function. Five regional health enter-
prises with separate professional boards were however established, and
responsibility for hospitals was moved from the county municipalities to
a new administrative territorial arrangement subordinated to the line
Ministry of Health. The case is thus an interesting example of administra-
tive decentralization and political centralization (Lægreid, Opedal, and
Stigen 2005). A small part of the hospital reform was reversed when
the center-left government came to power in 2005, because it brought
politicians back onto the boards of hospitals.
It can be said that there has been a general trend toward increased
agencification and vertical specialization, but especially in politically
salient areas such as immigration, health, and regulation, it seems to be
difficult for politicians to grant the agencies extended autonomy and
abstain from political control and interference. An important issue in the
Norwegian case has been the one of political control and vertical coordi-
nation, which has been somehow undermined by increased vertical spe-
cialization, as illustrated by the immigration case. Vertical despecialization
was applied in sectors where local authorities (county councils) manage
policy (here, hospitals). This is a major difference to the French case where
no recentralization from the local authorities to the state has occurred.
Horizontal Specialization and Despecialization—and Coordination
Efforts. From the mid-1990s, Norway faced a twofold process concerning
the horizontal dimension of specialization. On the one hand, when differ-
ent functions were fulfilled within the same organization, reforms pro-
moted horizontal specialization by splitting integrated government
department services into single-purpose organizations. Typically, separate
bodies for regulation and scrutiny, for service delivery, for policy advice,
and for infrastructure were established.
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On the other hand, there was also a process of horizontal despecializa-
tion going on whereby different organizations that fulfilled the same
function or had similar tasks were merged. This concerned regulatory
tasks, such as when five regulatory agencies were merged into a single
regulatory food agency, and service provision tasks, such as when differ-
ent types of higher education organization were merged into university
colleges. This kind of horizontal despecialization thus typically takes place
internally within a ministerial portfolio and rather than externally across
sectoral boundaries. Two examples illustrate this process, one of which
was a success, while the other failed.
In 2005, a reform of the Norwegian Welfare Administration was
approved by the Parliament. The centerpiece of this reform was a merger
of the employment administration, represented by the Directorate of
Labour, and the National Insurance Administration into a single new
labor and welfare agency, the NAV, represented on all levels. It was also
decided that a new local frontline service should be organized—a one-
stop shop—comprising of a partnership between the NAV and the social
services—a municipality responsibility in Norway. Although controversial
(Christensen, Fimreite, and Lægreid 2007), the reform was rather success-
fully implemented. The holistic aspect of the reform was central. On
the central level, the NAV reform implied extensive horizontal despecial-
ization and has probably tilted the balance more in the direction of central
control (Fimreite and Lægreid 2009). In some cases, however, the merger
appeared to be politically sensitive and problematic.
The case of internal security illustrates the difficulties of horizontal spe-
cialization. In 1999, a process was launched to reorganize the central
apparatus for internal security. A public commission assessed the vulner-
ability of Norwegian society and proposed ways to improve vertical and
horizontal coordination in the security administration. The suggestion was
to establish a new ministry of internal security that would merge the
various agencies in charge of functions viewed as interdependent. These
recommendations were not, however, approved by the government in the
White Paper presented to parliament in 2002, and most of the bodies and
actors involved refused to be merged into one organization. The process
resulted in only minor changes in the security administration (Lægreid
and Serigstad 2006). The compromise solution was to strengthen the coor-
dinating responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry has gradu-
ally increased its cross-ministerial responsibility in this policy area, but it
is still weak. The main principle of individual organizational responsibil-
ity for internal security based on sectoral specialization trumped the need
for stronger horizontal coordination across ministerial areas.
These two examples of recent cross-sector reform initiatives show that
it is easier to achieve such integration within a ministerial portfolio than
across ministerial areas. During the first term of the center-left govern-
ment elected in 2005, the problem of interministerial coordination also
became a higher priority on the political agenda. After the government
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was reelected in 2009, the prime minister’s office was strengthened by the
appointment of a special minister for interministerial coordination—a
new construction in the Norwegian central government.
Significantly, another kind of vertical specialization, involving political
decentralization combined with horizontal despecialization, failed in
Norway. For the center-left government, a regional reform was a central
element in the government declaration in 2005. The government wanted to
merge 19 counties into five or six larger regions and transfer responsibili-
ties and tasks from central government to the new regions. As for the
counties, the new regions were to be polities with their own elected
politicians and councils. The proposal met resistance from the adminis-
trative and political executive in the counties, and it was also considered
too ambitious to simultaneously merge counties and decentralize respon-
sibilities. Instead of an extensive reform, the Norwegian government
ended up keeping the 19 counties as they were but delegated some addi-
tional tasks to them, such as responsibility for regional roads. This reform
tried to enhance territorial vertical specialization at the expense of sectoral
specialization but failed.
French Reforms
The Reform Mode. Like in Norway, the influence of NPM recipes on
administrative reforms in France increased gradually from the late 1980s
but was only significant in transformative policies in the early 2000s (Bezes
2009, 2010). In contrast to Norway, the recent French reforms were rather
transversal and consisted of initiatives from the center extending to all
sector-based ministries.1 In 2001, the reform of the French budget proce-
dure (called Loi organique relative aux lois de finances [LOLF]) systematically
adopted many internationally dominant instruments of performance man-
agement and imposed them on ministries as a new mode of control. In 2007,
the Fillon right-wing government and the newly elected President Sarkozy
launched a General Review of Public Policies (RGPP) with explicit refer-
ences to the Canadian Program Review initiated in 1995–1996 and to the
UK’s 1999 Comprehensive Spending Reviews. The RGPP claimed to be
engaged in “rethinking the state” in response to the fiscal imperatives of
state debt and the state deficit. A major program of mergers affecting all
ministries was decided concerning central administrations but also, even
more systematically, the territorial state and its ministerial local units.
Vertical Specialization and Despecialization and Implications for Coordi-
nation. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the process of agencification
remained unsystematic and limited compared with other European coun-
tries (United Kingdom and the Netherlands). As usual in the French
context, the creation of new autonomous public bodies dominantly took
the legal form of the établissements publics, used since decades for many
already existing autonomous public bodies (Lafarge 2011; Rochet 2002).
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On the one hand, newly created agencies were set up since the 1990s to
respond to social or economic demands or to face the growing issues of
risk regulation, often in crisis situations. The health and risk sectors have
been the privileged site for the creation of agencies over the last few years,
with the aim of ensuring that these bodies would be more independent of
political control (Benamouzig and Besançon 2005). On the other hand,
new agencies were tasked with new functions and moved away from their
initial ministries or institutions. New agencies were rare in the four key
ministries of state (the Interior, Justice, Defence, and Foreign Affairs), but
numerous in Agriculture, Social Affairs, Culture, and Research, within this
legal form of établissements publics. The growing number of agencies
resulted in overlapping responsibilities and poor cooperation between
agencies as well as between agencies and traditional state services.
Another move toward increased vertical specialization was generated
by the 2003–2004 decentralization wave that transferred new competen-
cies to the regional and départemental governments. Decentralization poli-
cies have been politically attractive for the last 30 years in France and still
were in the early 2000s. Supported by local politicians and benefiting from
their influence on the policymaking system, decentralization has
remained high on the French political agenda. The approval of a new
Decentralization Act in 2003/2004, whereby more competencies and
128,000 civil servants were transferred from state to local governments
(regional and départemental), illustrates this fact (Le Lidec 2007).2 Like in
Norway, however, the idea of rationalizing the structures of regional gov-
ernment by merging or reducing the départemental level was unlikely to
succeed because local politicians are acting as strong veto players through
the Senate and multiple office-holding (Le Lidec 2009, 2012). Political
decentralization only tends to be supported when it is dissociated from the
rationalization of local government structures. Owing to the two waves of
decentralization, many public policies are now mainly implemented by
local authorities and not by the state, a high number of them being copro-
duced by the state and the local governments.
Contrary to Norway, no process of vertical despecialization to central
government occurred in the French case where decentralization policies
have been the favorite reform route. However, a process of vertical despe-
cialization has taken place recently within the French territorial state. The
first emergence of this trend appeared for specific sector-based policies. In
1996, regional hospital agencies were developed with power of accredita-
tion and the remit to merge public hospitals. Endowed with increased
powers to control hospitals in 2003, these regulatory health-care organi-
zations are designed to reduce the autonomy of nonstate actors and
develop regulatory standards and contracts over hospitals (Hassenteufel
2008). This process of vertical despecialization was intensified within
the RGPP in relation to another dominant horizontal despecialization
movement through mergers at the départemental level. It was decided to
shorten a bit the vertical chain of command and to tighten the départemen-
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tal organization of state services by merging units and creating three
interministerial directorates. The organizational change defines an
implicit objective to significantly decrease the number of “front office
agents” in local ministerial units at the départemental level. Several “back-
office” agencies grouping together highly qualified bureaucrats with pro-
fessional expertise were created at different levels.
Vertical specialization and despecialization within the French public
administration have implications for coordination issues. Two types of
coordination mechanism—hierarchical through formal rules and political
through politicized appointments and a reaffirmation of the political
executive—have been reactivated. On the one hand, a new formal hierarchy
between administrative levels (regional and départemental) was introduced
in 2007–2010, combined with the functional specialization of state field
services and related to a repositioning of the prefects. The regional level was
thus strengthened at the expense of the départemental one. The regional
prefect is now considered to be the pilot, coordinator, and arbitrator in state
interministerial action. Regional prefects have gained stronger formal
powers over the new merged regional units (see below) but also over other
ministerial services. A new hierarchy was also introduced within the
prefectoral corps: The regional prefect is now supposed to have more
authority over the prefects of départements, although the latter have rein-
forced their interministerial powers. This reform has reinforced a hierar-
chical mode of coordination that has been reactivated through the creation
of new General Secretariats within the main ministries (Chevallier 2005).
On the other hand, political coordination mechanisms have been reaf-
firmed. This is related primarily to a change in executive relationships. At
the level of the political executive, the French system granted greater
powers to the president. Under President Sarkozy, there has been a “presi-
dentialization” of the political leadership. These changes in the political
leadership have been driven by various kinds of dynamics reinforcing the
political modes of coordination that tighten the central steering of minis-
tries through political appointments, the growing influence of political
advisers, and the creation of new presidential units (Bezes and Le Lidec
2011). Several new organizations have been put under the supervision of
the Office of the Presidency and are therefore accountable to the president.
Horizontal Despecialization and Specialization and Implication for
Coordination. Another dominant and most systematic reform trend has
been toward horizontal despecialization through mergers, while some
specific cases of horizontal specialization of state management tasks have
also taken place. From the late 1990s, state services related to a specific
function were given greater autonomy to fulfil operational tasks at a
national level and were given the new status of “Offices with National
Competence,” a new legal form created in 1997. The aim of this process of
horizontal specialization was to create new specialized agencies at the
national level in order to offer increased competency and economies of
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scale and to professionalize the delivery of specific managerial tasks within
the state. The agency “France Trésor” (AFT) was created in 2001 with
responsibility for managing the national debt (Lemoine 2011). Several new
organizations followed, including a national agency for delivering official
documents (passports, ID cards, etc.), a national organization for wages, a
state property agency, and a state purchasing service. The creation of these
new organizations brought about the horizontal specialization of the inter-
ministerial, internal, and “back office” functions of the state. However, this
trend remains modest and the autonomy of these organizations limited.
By contrast, in 2007, after the presidential election of Nicolas Sarkozy
and the launching of the RGPP, forms of horizontal despecialization have
been more systematically adopted at various levels. The government
decided to carry out a drastic reorganization designed to systematically
bring about horizontal despecialization through mergers (Bezes and Le
Lidec 2010). First, in the new government led by Prime Minister François
Fillon in 2007, boundaries between ministries were redrawn, and the
number of full ministers was significantly reduced, leading to the creation
of big meta-ministries. Second, several mergers took place of central direc-
torates or central organizations within ministries. In 2008, the creation of
the “Pole Emploi” involved the merger of two large agencies, respectively,
in charge of employment and benefits. In the same year, the creation of the
General Directorate of Public Finances merged two of the oldest depart-
ments of the Ministry of Finance: the General Directorate of Taxes and the
General Directorate of Public Accounting, both well known for the impor-
tance of their territorial state units. In 2009, a merger between the national
police belonging to the Ministry of the Interior and the French Gendarm-
erie, a state military force belonging to the Ministry of Defence, was
initiated, whereby the Gendarmerie became attached to the Ministry of the
Interior. More generally, from 2007, a reduction in the number of central
administrative directorates took place. Like in Norway, these mergers can
be said to gather organizations fulfilling “proximate functions,” but his-
torically the activities of these organizations have been more complemen-
tary than similar. Mergers thus appear to be chiefly political decisions that
give rise to much conflict and resistance.
The movement toward horizontal despecialization was even reinforced
by the reorganization through mergers of the territorial state administra-
tion, both at the regional and the départemental levels (Bezes and Le Lidec
2010). Within the RGPP, it was decided to reorganize the regional level,
merging the 23 ministerial regional directorates into eight regional direc-
torates whose boundaries match up with those of the new “big minis-
tries.” At the départemental level, the organization of state services was
also tightened by the creation of three interministerial directorates, thus
merging the dozen existing ministerial directorates at the départemental
level and departing from the logic of ministerial boundaries. Here, in
contrast to the Norwegian case, the majority of mergers aimed to generate
savings and to internalize conflicts and arbitration between different
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policy units and their specific policy areas and interests. The objective was
also to weaken historical ministry-based specialization.
Reorganizations designed to bring about horizontal despecialization
can be said to have favored the reinforcement of the political mode of
coordination (Bezes and Le Lidec 2011). Since the 2000s, the logic of
organizational reforms has sought to increase the coordination of public
policies within ministries but has also considerably tightened political
control over ministry activities by having a small number of “super senior
civil servants” at the central level, thus reinforcing politicization at the
territorial level. Indeed, reducing the number of central administrative
directorates was one requirement for strengthening the bonds of trust that
the heads of the executive may have with each of them. These “super
senior civil servants” enjoy more direct relationships, not only with their
own minister, but also with the Head of State. Political modes of coordi-
nation were also strengthened within the state at the territorial level,
although with distinct forms. The merged ministerial units at the regional
level are increasingly accountable and responsive toward their central
administrations and the minister. At the départemental level, the new inter-
ministerial state territorial units are placed under the direct supervision of
the prefects. In short, the rationale for the process of reorganization in the
2000s is aimed at having fewer full ministers and fewer but more respon-
sive civil servants at the center with more authority, who are more loyal
and who report more directly to the minister, the Head of Government or
even the Head of State (Bezes and Le Lidec 2011).
Comparative Discussion
Both countries embarked on NPM reforms later than many other
Western countries. Although they have both been afflicted with reorga-
nization fever, each has followed a distinct mode of reform and a dif-
ferent structuring pattern (Table 1). A major difference between the
French and the Norwegian reforms is that the French reforms have
recently become more radical and comprehensive, while the Norwegian
reforms are more hesitant. Another major difference between Norway
and France is that while many of the major reforms in Norway are typi-
cally sector-specific reforms, such as the hospital reform or the welfare
administration reform, the French reforms have more systematically
pursued cross-sectoral and overarching goals since 2007.
The pattern of reforms has also been different. The Norwegian reforms
have favored vertical specialization and specialization by sector, as exem-
plified by the hospital reform and the reorganization of the immigration
administration. To some extent, this has reinforced the historical tra-
dition of the Norwegian administration—that is, its strong vertical
specialization—while introducing some new directions. This trend has
served to highlight the problems of horizontal coordination. NPM instru-
ments such as performance management or attempts to reinforce political
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control have been used to counterbalance the trend toward more vertical
segmentation. Path-breaking trends—reforms aimed at increasing vertical
specialization from the state to the local authorities via decentralization and
mergers—such as the regional reform, or reforms challenging sector-based
specialization such as the reorganization of internal security, have been
rather limited and unsuccessful. Reforms addressing horizontal specializa-
tion have been more successful in cases where they are able to operate
within a broad ministerial portfolio such as the welfare administration.
TABLE 1
Comparing Contemporary Administrative Reforms
France Norway
Modes of change Reluctant reformer until the
early 2000s. Growing NPM
influence from the mid-1990s
to the 2000s. Incremental
reforms (1997–2004).
Structural and systematic
changes in 2007–2010 based
on mergers
A reluctant reformer until
the mid-1990s. More
eager NPM reformer until
2005. Then post-NPM-
oriented reforms related
to problems in specific
sectors
Vertical
specialization
Vertical specialization
through decentralization and
sporadically through the
creation of agencies in
specific policy sectors. Some
vertical despecialization by
reducing the départemental
level
Reinforcement of historical
vertical specialization—
moving politics out by
agencification. Then attempts
at vertical despecialization
Horizontal
specialization
Systematic horizontal
despecialization within all
sector-based ministries and
for policy delivery functions.
Horizontal specialization for
managerial tasks
A mix of horizontal
despecialization for
organizations fulfilling
“similar” tasks and of
horizontal specialization
by splitting different
functions fulfilled within the
same organization
Decentralization
reform
Success of decentralization
reforms but recently more
central control
Failure of decentralization
reform
Coordination and
political control
Reaffirmation of hierarchical
mechanisms of coordination
(between administrative
levels) + reinforcement of
political mechanisms of
coordination + strengthen
prefects’ authority at local
level
Increased problems of
coordination due to an
increase in vertical
specialization—creation
of a special minister for
interministerial
coordination—attempts to
increase political control
NPM, New Public Management.
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By contrast, the French reform pattern has predominantly favored ver-
tical specialization by decentralization and a late but systematic horizontal
despecialization through mergers. Vertical specialization through agenci-
fication has remained gradual and has mainly taken place in policy sectors
where political blame is likely to occur. Both systems have faced big
challenges regarding horizontal coordination, but these issues have been
addressed differently by France and Norway. In France, interministerial
coordination has been more up front. It is significant that existing modes
of coordination, hierarchical but also political, have been reactivated but
also redirected.
Explaining Organizational Reforms:
The Politics of Structural Choices
Why did Norwegian reformers dominantly and continuously favor the
reinforcement of vertical specialization with some despecialization for
specific sectors (hospitals) but no overall political decentralization while
French reformers mostly favored horizontal despecialization, political
decentralization, and some vertical specialization in specific sectors? None
of the complex forms of change we describe strictly mirror the historical
traditions of organization so the mechanical “path-dependency” argument
cannot be applied here. There is no one factor explaining change in the
structural anatomy of the Norwegian and French state apparatus. Rather,
the explanation lies in specific combinations of political strategies articu-
lated to issues of political control and sometimes policy related, external
pressure and institutional constraints in each country. Our argument is that
the way these factors are combined and their modes of interdependence
differ between the two countries. In this last part, we will first emphasize
the importance of political control. Then, we will examine how institutional
and polity features, on the one hand, and external pressures, on the other,
have reinforced, reorientated, or curbed the political strategies.
Political Control
Norway. In the Norwegian case, political factors as well as the influence of
NPM favored the option of more vertical specialization. Both before and
after 2005, politicians were key actors in putting reform issues on the
political agenda. While before 2005, the center-right government was a
rather eager NPM reformer, after the Red–Green coalition was elected in
2005, the government became more sceptical vis-à-vis new NPM reforms
without wanting to turn the clock back to the pre-NPM period. In the
welfare administration, the parliament was a main initiator of reform,
deciding on its main components, while the responsible minister also
played a key role. In the hospital reform and also the regulatory reform,
the responsible ministers were the key reform agents. The political
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executive also heavily influenced the recent reforms of the immigration
administration.
Although differences exist between the center-right government’s
enthusiasm for NPM and the scepticism of the center-left government
toward NPM (specifically expressed in the extent of corporatization),
there is no major cleavage between the different governments regarding
the reform process. Incoming governments have reversed none of the
reforms, and indeed, many of the major reforms have been decided on by
one government and implemented by the next government without any
big changes being made. This applies to the hospital reform and the
welfare administration reform. The adoption of this “continuity” option
reveals that, generally speaking, Norwegian political reformers have no
problem with installing existing or new organizations at arms’ length from
the political executive, thus reinforcing the distance between them and the
more autonomous agencies. Politicians in Norway do not consider more
vertical specialization to present major or insoluble problems of control. In
general, they do not fear losing their capacity to intervene in the day-to-
day functioning and management of their services. Of course, there have
been cases where changes in the political leadership or partisan majorities
or the specifics of some politically sensitive policies may generate greater
concerns about political control. This was the case with respect to the
hospital reform and the immigration reform, for instance.
The center-left government has also generally been more reluctant to
launch new major reforms, and in its overall reform program labeled “An
Administration for Democracy and Community” has signaled an
increased interest in post-NPM reform initiatives focusing on democratic
participation, horizontal coordination, and integration in the administra-
tive apparatus (Christensen and Lægreid 2011). However, the dominant
trend is that entrusting autonomous agencies with responsibilities for
public policy does not represent an unusual political choice in the Nor-
wegian context. One reason for this is that there is a high level of mutual
trust between central agencies and ministries and also between political
and administrative executives. Besides, the fact that electoral campaigns in
Norway are collectively defined and held according to proportional rep-
resentation, so that parties rather than individual politicians compete with
one another, does not make political control a salient problem.
France. Contrary to their Norwegian counterparts, French political
reformers have been consistently reluctant to support organizational
choices devolving functions to authorities further away from political
control. Significantly, the various official commissions for reforming the
state, created in the 1990s, never strongly advocated the idea of differen-
tiating the French administration into autonomous administrative units or
agencies (Bezes 2007), while other NPM recipes were more popular. Gen-
erally speaking, French politicians have been hostile to every organiza-
tional change likely to decrease their political control. This could be
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explained by several institutional mechanisms in the French context: the
domination of the executive, strong individualization of political careers
linked to extensive use of the single-member district system, forms of
political clientelism, lower level of mutual trust between administrative
organizations at different levels, and between political and administrative
executives and the historical and long-lasting use of politicization and
centralization mechanisms. All these elements have historically favored
the development of structures that maximize capacity for political control,
for individual casework and servicing voters. Agencies have mainly been
created in policy sectors where risks were high (health, etc.) because of
uncertain expertise and where politicians were likely to be blamed.
In other situations, French reformers have been very reluctant to
relinquish their capacity to intervene in ordinary, day-to-day policy. This
explains why vertical specialization was developed on an ad hoc rather
than a systematic basis. It is hence not surprising that horizontal de-
specialization through mergers was the favored option. From a political
point of view, mergers at the central and regional levels have considerably
tightened control over ministerial activities by creating a small and
reduced number of leading positions and “super senior civil servants”
whose task is to implement the goals pursued by the political executive
(Bezes and Le Lidec 2011). In short, fewer full ministers, fewer senior civil
servants at the center. Horizontal despecialization through mergers is
likely to reinforce politicization and political control. What is more, the
design of the mergers was aimed at reducing ambiguities and internaliz-
ing conflicts and political arbitration within the new big entities. Positive
coordination and the resolution of conflicts between public policies are
then more likely to be strengthened within macro-ministries and director-
ates, thus forcing them to make political choices between contradictory
alternatives. However, the distinct and contradictory choices made for the
organization of the state at the regional level (ministerial units) and at the
départemental units (interministerial units) are likely to blur these effects
and to weaken the global coordinative logic at work.
Summing up, political control matters to a greater extent in France,
while in Norway, issues of political control does not really prevail to the
same extent. To get a better understanding of the reform processes and
their outcome, we have to take external factors as well as institutional
features into consideration.
Institutional Features
Norway. Norway seems to have adjusted to the new international trend of
administrative reforms and to the specific problems generated by the
reforms’ organizations in a pragmatic, incremental and cautious manner.
The existence of strong sector ministries and a government administration
ministry with weak horizontal coordinative power explain the reform style
but also why reforms have been more often driven by sector-specific
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initiatives than by government-initiated comprehensive and binding
general reform programs. In Norway, the institutional and polity features
seem to reinforce the segmentation of the administrative system and
explain why the major reforms were driven by sector specific issues,
demands, and problems. Compared to the overarching reforms, the sector-
specific reforms have been bigger and more comprehensive. It is obviously
easier to implement radical reforms within each sector than across sectors.
As illustrated by the reform of the welfare administration, administrative
reorganizations have usually been long-term processes where the diagnosis
of the problem and the calling in of expertise to solve it were subject to
discussion, debate, and iterations. The historical legacy of a governmental
model of ministerial rule has also clearly affected changes in the formal
organizational structure of central government in Norway.
France. Organizational reforms in the French context have been embed-
ded in the multitiered system of French administrative organization,
whereby two strongly competing but interlinked patterns—territorial and
sector-based forms of vertical specialization—are combined. For minis-
tries, reforming the structures of their central administrations is likely to
generate side effects on their territorial ministerial organization that will
limit their initiatives. In addition, ministries often find it difficult to reform
their territorial ministerial organization on an autonomous sector-specific
basis because the proposed reorganization conflicts with the interests and
conceptions of the prefects, who defend the territorial state. This dual and
competing supervision of the territorial state units explains why, before
2007, sector-based ministerial initiatives were always designed on an ad
hoc and experimental basis with limited effects. Finally, local governments
often oppose reorganizations of ministerial territorial units because they
are likely to reduce public jobs in their respective geographical areas. The
result at the level of everyday policy has been usually more incremental
reforms or even institutional inertia, because the political costs were high
and politicians usually wanted to avoid blame for organizational matters.
Because all reorganizational issues are linked and interdependent, reform
design, when it emerges, is more likely to be cross-ministerial and trans-
versal than sector based. This is all the more likely as centripetal and
centralist administrative actors—the Finance, Interior/Home Office, and
Civil Service ministries—are more powerful actors (Bezes 2007) in the
French context than their corresponding ministries in the Norwegian
system. These actors have been eager to impose their transversal and
general views on the whole system. When change did occur, like in 2007,
this also reflected the presence of a strong political leadership, but this
situation was rare.
External Pressure from Technical and Institutional Environment
Norway. A number of other factors reinforced the orientation toward
vertical specialization. It is hard to see reform as only home grown,
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because a lot of inspiration and learning is derived from abroad with
reform ideas diffused from one country to another, but these processes are
often rather complicated. Even though neither Norway nor France were
NPM front-runners, the reforms they have implemented still bear the
stamp of international reform movements, especially more recent reforms.
In Norway, NPM ideas and later post-NPM ideas coming from abroad are
obviously part of the story. Examples of this are structural devolution,
regulatory reforms, and the ideas of single-purpose organizations and
performance management systems. These NPM ideas, which reinforce
vertical specialization, were specifically compatible with the historical
organization of the Norwegian state so that reforms were likely to be
implemented quickly. Another argument is that because the NPM per-
formance management recipe was simultaneously adopted, it offered
a positive counterbalance, in terms of control, to increased vertical
specialization.
The budgetary situation did not represent a constraint on increased
governance at distance either, even though this could potentially generate
an increase in public expenditure. Norway is a prosperous country with a
healthy economy and a high standard of living. Its management of oil
assets by the government Pension Fund—Global is an example of long-
term budgetary planning. Owing to its small population and huge rev-
enues from offshore oil and gas, Norway has experienced less budgetary
pressure than many other European countries and hence the pressure for
cutbacks and savings has been weaker in Norway. Besides, vertical spe-
cialization was also compatible with the historical configuration of veto
players and was supported by the state employees’ unions (Roness 2001)
in line with the strong corporative tradition in Norway and the participa-
tory model of modernization in the Nordic countries.
From this perspective, how can we explain the case for horizontal
despecialization (welfare), vertical despecialization (hospitals), and the
failure of political decentralization? Our argument is that these changes
occurred when one of the three converging factors was distinctly oriented.
As previously said, the financial crisis had no obvious general effect on the
reforms. Most of them were launched before the global crisis occurred,
and Norway’s healthy financial situation meant that the public sector
reform process was not affected by it to any significant extent. However, in
sectors where budgetary problems arose, distinct organizational changes
were introduced. One of the arguments behind the hospital reform was to
gain (political) control over the budget deficit and over the galloping and
uncontrolled expenditure on health care. This might explain why vertical
despecialization (from local governments to the state) was preferred (but
linked to vertical specialization from the state to publicly owned enter-
prises.) Financial arguments and issues of political control were also
important in the welfare administration reform and explain why horizon-
tal despecialization was the preferred option here. The failure of political
decentralization is compatible with our argument about Norwegian
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politicians’ espousal of management of public policy by autonomous
administrations. Political decentralization would amount to entrusting
regionally elected politicians and complex partisan majorities with public
policy. Hence, for political reasons, this has not been the dominant
approach chosen in Norway in the recent period.
France. In the French case, the political factor in favor of horizontal despe-
cialization was reinforced by external pressures. In France, the growing
deficit and debt as well as European pressure from 2004 to 2007 high-
lighted the objective of reducing public expenditure and lent it more
political weight. These budgetary problems have led to major reorganiza-
tions of the public sector and the architecture of the state, which have been
advocated as a way of downsizing and achieving economies of scale. The
RGPP systematized these aims and evolved into a government policy
dedicated to scrutinizing how resources in the administration could be
better used. The RGPP claimed to be “rethinking the state” as a way of
tackling the fiscal imperatives of reducing the debt and the deficit and
realizing the twofold objectives of downsizing government and imple-
menting managerial-style reforms intended to make the bureaucracy
more efficient (Bezes and Le Lidec 2010).
Organizational mergers involving both central directorates and state
field units and the promotion of the regional level as the main level for
steering and coordinating public policy have been defended as an “effi-
cient form” with a twofold purpose. Mergers has been used as a tool to
generate a significant decrease in the number of state public agents, spe-
cifically by reducing the important number of “front office agents” in local
ministerial units at the départemental level. In addition, the supremacy of
the regional level over the départemental state units may allow significant
economies of scale to be made by merging back-office functions in such
areas as finance, IT support, and human resources management but also
in policy-oriented functions requiring specific expertise. This call for
mergers and horizontal despecialization was supported by consultancy
firms, which have played a major role as producers and disseminators of
“structural reform” standards since the early 2000s. The growing influence
of their rationalizing and “cost-killing” recipes has been recognized
(Berrebi-Hoffmann and Grémion 2009; Bezes and Le Lidec 2010). In the
French context, mergers are thus “ambiguous” organizational solutions
likely to be adopted as a result of “ambiguous agreement” (Palier 2005). A
precise analysis of the different positions adopted toward mergers shows
that the various reformers involved agree on them but for very different,
often contradictory, reasons. Mergers are expected to achieve economies,
to favor reinforced political control, and also to offer a response to the
French problems of coordination.
In this perspective, the case for horizontal specialization only refers to
situations where the objective was to make specific tasks within the state
more efficient and professional through rationalization and the creation of
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specifically allocated units. The success of political decentralization—and
hence of increased vertical but political specialization—confirms the
specificity of the French organizational trend. Political decentralization
transfers responsibility for public policy and related political arbitration
from central to local government, thus illustrating French government
concern to reinforce political control over policy and its hostility toward
solutions where public policy is entrusted to autonomous administrative
organizations/agencies.
Conclusion
The reform cases analyzed in this article show diverse reform processes in
which several driving forces supplement and complement one another and
in combination explain reform trajectories. Rather than an either–or expla-
nation, we need to combine different explanatory factors. Reform outcomes
cannot be explained in terms of single features—be they free choice by
powerful political executives, structural and polity constraints, diffusion
and learning from abroad, or adaptation to the financial crisis and budget
deficit, but only by a combination of such features. Another theoretical
lesson is that in trying to rearrange the historical structure of sectoral and
territorial specialization, reform processes introduce a balance of autonomy
and integration elements. The discussion has revealed that we need to treat
autonomy and integration and specialization and coordination as mutually
dependent processes. This argument of coevolution and mutually depen-
dent processes in multilevel governance is well known in the literature on
integration and autonomy in the European Union (Egeberg 2004; Olsen
2004), on autonomy and control in the field of administrative reform
(Lægreid and Verhoest 2010), and on the relationship between specializa-
tion and coordination (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010).
What can be learned from these findings about the evolution of coor-
dination and specialization in the modern state both in a comparative
perspective and in more general theoretical terms? A first comparative
lesson concerns the effects of globalization and the financial crisis. One
might have expected external pressure, NPM diffusion, and institutional
choices to have resulted in convergence toward similar organizational
forms or at least similar trends of reorganization. Our comparative analy-
sis reveals two reasons why this is not the case. First, the two countries
have not faced the same pressures: The financial crisis imposed strong
constraints in France, offering a window of opportunity to reorganize and
amplify existing and available solutions rather than generating new direc-
tions in reorganizing trends; this was not the case in Norway. Second, the
two countries have not systematically adopted the same reorganizational
recipes. General conclusions advocating convergence or divergence
(Pollitt 2007) are too broad to successfully explain the diverse empirical
realities and the operating trends. Our comparative perspective empha-
sizes the need to make distinctions between elements of convergence and
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divergence. While both countries experienced a renewal of control
through managerial tools, it is remarkable that French reformers predomi-
nantly focused on horizontal despecialization, while Norwegian govern-
ments tended to favor vertical specialization. In a schematic way, the
Norwegian administration favored intrasectoral reforms reaffirming min-
isterial silos with a managerial counterbalance, while the French state gave
priority to intersectoral reforms aimed at weakening ministerial logic and
reintroducing coordination issues. At first glance, these dominant trends
seem to be “path dependent,” with the Norwegian state reaffirming its
historical vertical specialization, while the French state has hybridized its
two structural patterns of specialization—territorial and sector based.
A second lesson relates to the changing organization of the modern
state. The first trend of reorganization identified, strongly influenced by
Anglo-American countries, has been the idea of increased fragmentation
of the state through increased vertical specialization. Our two cases show
that while vertical specialization does constitute an organizational recipe,
it is neither necessarily the dominant one (in France) nor systematically
implemented for all ministries and all related policy issues (in Norway).
The picture is more complex, and our analysis emphasizes the importance
of horizontal despecialization as a strong reorganizing trend. Some have
labeled it a post-NPM trend and see it as a reaction to, or even a reversal
of, previous NPM reforms and their unintended and undesirable effects.
The empirical findings in this article help to open the “black box” of
horizontal despecialization by identifying three rationales. First, merging
units may be a response to problems of coordination, although neither in
France nor in Norway were these issues of coordination exclusively pro-
voked by NPM reforms. Second, horizontal despecialization is also a way
to cut public expenditure by downsizing and achieving economies of scale
in times of budgetary crisis (France) or in policy sectors where these
problems are relevant (Norway). Third, in some contexts, mergers also
reflect a political strategy to regain political control by strengthening
hierarchies. This has been the case in France at a general level and in
Norway in specific policy sectors (immigration for instance) where issues
of political control were sensitive.
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Notes
1. This does not mean that ministries did not also develop their own specific
reforms in relation to the characteristics of their policies and to their idio-
syncratic power relationships (Jeannot and Guillemot 2010).
2. This transfer of a large number of civil servants was implemented through a
device allowing public agents to choose between an unlimited term contract
where agents could work for local authorities while maintaining their status
of state civil servants and a change of status where agents become members
of the French local civil service. This second option appeared to be more
attractive as it favored a significant improvement of their work and salary
conditions and secured their territorial links. See Cour des Comptes (2009,
93–105).
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